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Regional Financialisation and Financial Systems Convergence: Evidence from Italy 
 
Abstract: 
The term ‘financialisation’ has now entered the lexicon of academics and policy makers, 
though there is still no agreement on its meaning and significance. One of the earlier 
definitions was offered by Epstein (2005; see also Krippner, 2005), who referred to the 
growing weight of financial motives, financial actors and markets in the operation of modern 
economies, both at the national and international level, from the early 1980s until today. 
Building on this definition, this paper sheds further light on the implications of spatial 
financialisation, which has been associated with the over and under-extension of credit across 
and within countries and evolving financial instability. The paper’s primary contribution is to 
extend in a robust manner a powerful panel data convergence testing methodology to analyse 
the spatial scale and temporal evolution of Italian regional lending conditions. The paper 
concludes that financial divergence has broadly increased in Italian regions. Furthermore, we 
are able to link regional financialisation to the growing north-south divide in a significant and 
meaningful way. As a result the ability of southern regions in Italy to absorb adverse 
macroeconomic and financial shocks has been weakened. Relevant regional financial policies 
have thereby become very important.  
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1. Introduction
1
 
The term ‘financialisation’ has now entered the lexicon of academics and policymakers (e.g. 
Palley, 2013 and Turner, 2010, respectively), though there is still no agreement on its 
meaning and significance. One of the earlier definitions was offered by Epstein (2005; see 
also Krippner, 2005), who referred to the growing weight of financial motives, financial 
actors and markets in the operation of modern economies, both at the national and 
international level, from the early 1980s until today. More recently, Van der Zwan (2014) has 
reviewed the origins of the term and its various definitions and highlights three features of the 
structural changes in modern societies that go under the label of financialisation; namely (1) a 
regime of accumulation dominated by financial motives and financial actors; (2) the 
ascendency of ‘shareholder value’ as a mode of business governance; and (3) the culture of 
individualism and market competition associated with it that dominates everyday life from 
housing, to pensions and utilities. This paper’s contribution focuses on regional 
financialisation and financial systems convergence in the context of Italian bank lending 
conditions. In doing so it draws on the first feature of financialisation as above, namely the 
dominance of the financial sector.   
According to neoclassical theory, the convergence process does not depend on the regional 
financial sector, above and beyond its role in facilitating the efficient intermediation of 
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finance and growth as part of the catching-up process (Moore and Nagurney, 1989). The 
mainstream literature provides advancement by accounting for financial frictions, 
imperfections and market segmentation due to the underlying principal-agent problem 
(Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). In particular, credit-rationing arises endogenously across the 
business cycle within New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models and works to amplify macroeconomic and financial shocks due to the ‘financial 
accelerator’ (Bernanke et al., 1996). The distribution of wealth affects the equilibrating 
process in a non-trivial way; however an important implication of the mainstream micro-
foundations is that during crises regions may experience temporary deviations from 
equilibrium in the form of uneven access to credit, differences in lending spreads and loan-
deposit premia. 
Post-Keynesians do not dispute the imperfections and constraints embedded within 
mainstream (New Keynesian) models; however they view regional credit supply and demand 
as interdependent and influenced by banking sector development and liquidity preference 
(Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes, 1997). Because there is a tendency for high savings and low 
expenditure in regions with under-developed banking sectors, the initial assumption in the 
heterodox literature is of divergence rather than convergence (Chick and Dow, 1998). 
According to Post-Keynesian liquidity preference theory, capital may flow from less 
developed regions to more prosperous, liquid and financialised regions, in a self-reinforcing 
mechanism, which manifests itself in the development of centralised financial hubs and 
spatial clustering of credit conditions (Dow 1992, 1999). This has led some to conclude that 
uneven financial sector growth may increase income inequalities and make financial crises 
more likely to re-appear in the future (see, for example, Lapavitsas, 2009; Stockhammer, 
2012; Dow et al., 2012).  
Italy is a particularly interesting case because of its longstanding north-south divide in terms 
of economic characteristics and financial structure (see, for example, D’Amico et al., 1990; 
Faini et al., 1993; Dunford, 2002). Despite the implementation of various policies designed to 
promote financial liberalisation and convergence, the economic and financial disparities have 
become more pronounced over recent years and the prospect of convergence seems even 
further out of sight (Kitson et al., 2011). Moreover, the view emerging from the empirical 
literature is that spatial financialisation, in terms of uneven regional financial sector 
development and accumulation, may be linked to the growing north-south divide. See, for 
example, Martin and Minns (1995) for the United Kingdom; Rodriguez-Fuentes (1998) for 
Spain; Dow et al. (2012) for Italy; Crocco et al. (2014) for Brazil.
2
 In particular, this process 
may be beneficial for certain agents, namely those located in centralised financial hubs; 
however, it may disadvantage agents in more remote, periphery regions. 
This paper’s contributions relative to the literature are as follows. First, the vast majority of 
studies conduct analysis at an international level, which may mask considerable intra-national 
heterogeneity (Corrado et al., 2005). Studies investigating convergence of lending conditions 
have been constrained by regional financial data quality and availability. Importantly, this 
paper makes use of greater availability of harmonised NUTS-2 level data on bank lending 
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growth, lending spreads and loan-deposit premia, thus facilitating a more extensive empirical 
investigation for the Italian case.
3
 Second, the (non-mainstream) approaches discussed above, 
while empirically grounded, are also theoretical. However, they involve much more than 
imperfections and financial frictions (i.e. constraints on the mainstream convergence model), 
while at the same time not purporting to predict the exact spatial scale of convergence (or 
divergence) because these processes operate within a system, which is open and evolving. In 
this sense, the use of the flexible, data-driven clustering methodology of Phillips and Sul 
(2007) may be preferred to one where the convergence process is assumed to be fixed across 
time and space. Third, this paper’s application of econometric techniques enables 
identification, testing and further explanation of the dynamics of convergence over a 
particularly interesting period, which extends beyond the global economic and financial crisis. 
In this latter sense our approach, which utilises the Phillips and Sul (op. cit.) method, 
provides some originality in that it has not been used to analyse changes in the speed of 
convergence to our knowledge so far.
4,5 The application is particularly useful due to the lack 
of power when conducting standard unit root and cointegration tests in small or moderate 
samples. 
The empirical strategy proposed in this paper proves insightful since it identifies situations 
where lending conditions are converging in certain regions even if divergence is detected at 
the aggregated level. First, application of Phillip and Sul’s (2007) clustering algorithm 
permits identification of a cluster of convergent regions, which are more central 
geographically than regions in the divergent cluster. Second, the estimated speed of 
divergence is higher in southern Italian regions than northern regions and it has increased 
notably since the onset of the global economic and financial crisis. Third, most of the 
evolving north-south divergence may be related to regional financialisation, liquidity 
preference and the distribution of income. Our findings suggest that the evolution of financial 
behaviour has become an important factor related to the growing north-south divide.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the convergence testing methodology 
and corresponding hypotheses. Section 3 provides background and describes the data. Section 
4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 provides further discussion and explanation. 
Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
Investigating the convergence of regional lending conditions is a complex task. Sigma 
convergence tests do not permit individual regions to be transitionally divergent, whereas 
beta convergence tests in the spirit of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) can yield biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the speed of convergence (Phillips and Sul, 2009). Therefore, 
negative estimates cannot be directly interpreted as evidence of convergence. Instead, this 
paper extends Phillips and Sul’s (2007) panel convergence test, which may be used to assess 
whether regional lending conditions are bound by a long-term equilibrium relationship, while 
incorporating evolving regional heterogeneity. Their log-t test more effectively detects the 
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presence of convergence than standard unit root and cointegration tests, whereby the 
underlying hypothesis of long-run equilibrium may be rejected in short-panel contexts due to 
data limitations.
6
 For example, in small or moderate samples, cointegration in lending 
conditions may not be detected if the speed of convergence is very gradual and insufficient to 
reflect cointegrated behaviour, even when the variables of interest are actually converging. 
Furthermore, the log-t convergence test is straightforward to implement in practice and 
incorporates a broad range of convergence possibilities without necessitating any specific 
assumptions about the stationarity of variables (Rughoo and Sarantis, 2014).
7
  
2.2 Testable Hypotheses 
To motivate the Phillips and Sul (2007) convergence test consider first equation (1), which 
provides a simple theoretical time-varying factor representation of lending market conditions, 
measured by xi,t, for Italian region i in period t: 
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As it is typically assumed in the literature (see, for example, Matousek et al., 2015), 
macroeconomic and financial panel data, including data on bank lending, may be 
decomposed into systematic component, gi,t, and transitory component, ai,t. Furthermore, xi,t 
may be expressed in terms of a common trend component, μt, and time-varying idiosyncratic 
component, δi,t, which measures the economic distance between the trend component μt and 
xi,t, as in equation (1). Equation (2), then, provides the expression for hi,t, the so-called 
relative transition coefficient, which effectively measures δi,t in relation to the cross-section at 
time t, thus providing a measure of the transition of region i relative to all Italian regions:  
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If regional transition coefficients δi,t converge to some fixed point δ, this implies that the 
relative transition coefficient of equation (2) converges to unity. According to Phillips and 
Sul’s (2007) model of transition, the rate at which the cross-sectional variation decays to zero, 
defined as α, must be non-negative for regional convergence.8 The general point is that, under 
convergence, the influence of common shocks prevails, whereas the influence of region-
specific shocks decays, thus enabling transition to equilibrium. The higher the rate of decay, 
the faster is the transition to equilibrium. In equilibrium ji   for i ≠ j, which implies  i , 
thereby enabling a statement of the null hypothesis of convergence as in equation (3).  
0,: ,0   tiH                                                                                                                      (3) 
Even under the null hypothesis in equation (3), the model allows for transitional periods in 
which tjti ,,   for i ≠ j, thereby incorporating possible transitional heterogeneity across 
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regions in the short and medium-term. However, the long-run implication of equation (3) is 
that, while short-run deviations from equilibrium may occur, long-term trends bind regions 
together through a cointegrating vector. 
Equations (4) and (5) present the alternative hypotheses, which incorporate two possibilities. 
In the first case, δi ≠ δ and regions i diverge with a negative speed of convergence, α < 0, 
which implies that region-specific shocks predominate over time in terms of their influence 
on lending conditions. However, transitional divergence does not eliminate the possibility of 
sub-panel convergence. In the second case, δi,t converges to δk, for some regions with a non-
negative speed of convergence, α ≥ 0. For K such groupings, G = [G1, G2,…,GK], where δi,t 
converges to δk, the number of regions across all groups sums to N.  
0,: ,   tiAH            (4) 
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Together with the null hypothesis in equation (3), the dual alternative hypotheses set out in 
equations (4) and (5) provide an appealing flexibility with respect to the underlying 
theoretical framework and account for various possibilities, including i) convergence of all 
regions, ii) divergence of all regions and, iii) convergence of only certain regions. While the 
first outcome is more in line with traditional convergence predictions, the second and third 
outcomes permit divergence or sub-panel convergence; whereby certain regions may be 
converging over time even if divergence is apparent. Thus, we allow for the interesting 
possibility of divergence and ‘club convergence’ in the form of spatial clustering of lending 
conditions, which may arise, for example, under heterodox theories of Chick and Dow (1998) 
and Dow (1992, 1999). 
The details of empirical implementation and estimation of the crucial speed of convergence 
parameter α are set out below. 
2.3 Log-t Panel Convergence Test 
The first step in implementing our empirical investigation is the extraction of the (non-
cyclical) trend component of the data, which enables more powerful inference of the long-run 
convergence properties in lending conditions (Phillips and Sul, 2007). Following other 
contributions, the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter is used to filter out the cyclical 
component of bank lending data (see, for example, Matousek et al., 2015). The indicators of 
lending market conditions, introduced and discussed below in section 3, are then computed 
based on the trend components and in turn these are used to calculate the filtered transition 
coefficients hi,t and mean square transition differential:
9
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The dataset is trimmed to validate the regression equation in terms of the asymptotic 
characteristics of transition and to ensure test consistency in convergence applications. The 
trimmed proportion, r, is set to 0.3, which is satisfactory according to Phillips and Sul (2007) 
on the basis of Monte Carlo experiments. After trimming the data, the following regression 
model is estimated:  
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The inclusion on the left-side of equation (7) of the slow-moving function of time, L(t), 
improves test performance under the alternative hypothesis advanced above. We follow the 
recommendation of Phillips and Sul (2007) by setting L(t) = log(t+1). Estimation is 
conducted on the trimmed sample starting at t = [rT].  
Phillips and Sul (2007) show that, under the null hypothesis of convergence, the normalised 
cross-sectional variance ratio H1/Ht tends to positive infinity and to negative infinity under 
the alternative hypothesis of sub-panel convergence. While parameter ϕ0 conveys no 
information about the speed of convergence, parameter ϕ1 corresponds to the scaled speed of 
convergence parameter, 2α. The implication of the underlying model of transition is that the 
higher the estimate of ϕ1, the greater is the speed of convergence. Under the baseline log-t 
model, the convergence test proceeds as a one-sided t-test of a ≥ 0. The null hypothesis of 
convergence is rejected if the normally-distributed test statistic lies below the relevant critical 
value for a one-sided test.  
To address sample heterogeneity and instability arising within the sample of study the 
baseline ordinary least squares estimation (LS) approach is combined with the iteratively re-
weighted least squares technique (IRLS) of Huber (1964). The IRLS model assigns a higher 
weight to observations, which are deemed better behaved and may be useful in addressing 
outlier observations and extreme observations associated with departures from non-normality 
arising during periods of crises. The use of LS and IRLS estimators enhances the robustness 
of the empirical strategy, although we also consider augmentations of the baseline log-t 
regression model to account for changes in the empirical association across the sample, which 
includes periods of substantial economic and financial instability.  
As discussed by Phillips and Sul (2009), the speed of convergence can change over time as 
regions shift from one economic regime to another; this cannot be ruled out given the 
structural and policy changes arising in our sample, particularly in response to the crisis. This 
may also be motivated by the concept of regime-sensitive cointegration, due to Siklos and 
Granger (1997), which is applicable to both large and small sample-sizes. To that end, the 
baseline model in equation (7) may provide limited insight into the time-variance of the 
convergence process. A related issue is that, in a short-panel context, a degrees-of-freedom 
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problem may arise under sub-sample estimation. Therefore, the baseline regression model in 
equation (7) is augmented with yearly intercept dummy variables and slope dummy variable 
interaction terms for the natural log of time index t. The interaction specification in equation 
(8), as below, permits investigation of whether and how the speed of convergence has 
changed over time. 
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In equation (8) the dependent variable is unchanged, although dummy variable terms are now 
included as additional regressors. Specifically, dummy variables, Dt, are used to identify 
temporal marginal effects on the intercept and slope respectively over yearly intervals. For 
the latter, interaction terms are included in the regression model, based on the product of the 
natural log of the time index and dummy variables, tDt log. .
10
 Therefore, ᴨ0,τ and ᴨ1,τ are a 
collection of temporal marginal intercept and slope effects over yearly intervals. This enables 
inference of the temporal speed of convergence across individual years of the trimmed 
sample and importantly it helps overcome in a short-panel context the restriction that the 
convergence process is fixed across time. The estimate ϕ1 + ᴨ1,τ corresponds to the scaled 
speed of convergence parameter, 2α. Under the augmented log-t model, the convergence test 
proceeds as a one-sided t-test of a ≥ 0; therefore, convergence may be inferred in any given 
year τ in equation (8) by testing whether ϕ1 + ᴨ1,τ ≥ 0. The null hypothesis of convergence is 
rejected if the normally-distributed test statistic lies below the relevant critical value of -1.645 
for a one-sided test. 
2.4 Log-t Sub-Panel Convergence 
Under the alternative hypothesis it is not possible to reject the possibility of sub-panel or 
cluster convergence; therefore, to identify regional groupings with similar convergence 
characteristics, we apply the clustering algorithm developed and detailed by Phillips and Sul 
(2007, 2009). This algorithm consists of the following steps. 
Step 1: The xi,t series are ordered according to the last observation, xi,T, and an initial regional 
grouping is formed by selecting the first k highest individuals to form the subgroup Gk for 
some 2 ≤ k < N, where N is the total number of Italian regions. The log-t regression is then 
run and the convergence test statistic tb(k) computed for this grouping. The initial grouping of 
size k* is identified by maximising the convergence test statistic according to the criterion 
min{tb(k)} > -1.645, where -1.645 is the lower critical value of the normal distribution 
corresponding to the 5% significance level.  
Step 2: Once the initial grouping of Italian regions is formed, each remaining region is added 
separately to this grouping. If the corresponding test statistic is greater than the chosen 
critical value, c, then the region is also included and forms the first cluster.
11
  
Step 3: In the final step, the log-t test is conducted on the regions not selected; if tb(k)} > -
1.645 then convergence is detected and the second cluster is formed. In the case of rejection, 
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this process is repeated from the start for the remaining regions. If no other convergence 
clusters are identified, then what remains is a divergent cluster comprising the remaining 
regions. 
 
3. Background and Data Description 
Italy is a country with longstanding regional inequalities and differences in productivity, 
employment and demographic growth (see, for example, Dunford, 2002). There are highly 
developed areas in terms of productive and banking structures, such as regions in the north-
east and north-west, and also poorer, under-developed regions, which rely on more traditional 
banking systems. Northern and southern Italian regions can also be related to the core-
periphery concept, insofar as the ‘core’ northern regions are more affluent and developed. 
The ‘periphery’ southern regions are generally poorer with under-developed banking sectors, 
which are characterised by higher perceived customer risk, regional power structures that 
inhibit competitiveness and limited physical access to banks prevail (see, for example, Faini 
et al., 1993). Southern regions are also more reliant on the primary sector and industries with 
lower technological content, whereas northern regions are oriented more to financial services 
and exposed to associated innovations.  
When investigating convergence of regional lending conditions, this paper considers several 
relevant indicators, including the growth in retail bank lending, the lending spread, and loan-
deposit premium to non-bank customers. Interest rate and lending growth data correspond to 
non-bank customers and consumer households respectively. Short and long-term nominal 
interest rate data are used to construct the lending spread; under this indicator, high demand 
for loans relative to supply in any region is reflected in high long-term interest rates relative 
to short-term rates.
12
 The difference between nominal lending and deposit rates is used to 
measure the loan-deposit premium, whereby tighter credit conditions in any region are 
indicated by high nominal lending interest rates relative to deposit rates.
13
 Using data on 
regional bank lending growth in addition to spread and premium indicators, it is possible to 
analyse more comprehensively Italian regional lending conditions.  
There are issues when undertaking empirical research concerning the seasonality of bank 
lending data. First, it is possible that seasonal unit roots may occur, particularly given the use 
of quarterly data. However, seasonality may present itself as a common trend across all 
regions, or a trend that is specific only to certain regions, in which case the underlying 
hypotheses of convergence versus sub-panel convergence or divergence, as set out in 
equations (3)-(5), remain relevant. Furthermore, for robustness, we conduct Hylleberg et al.’s 
(1990) test, which suggests that seasonal unit roots are not a characteristic of our bank 
lending data.
14
 Second, aside from the unit root issue, seasonal factors may generate intra-
annual variation in bank lending data, above and beyond other influential factors, including 
possible ‘outlier’ observations. In particular, the trend component of bank lending data may 
be distorted unless seasonal variation removed. However, after conducting a battery of 
seasonality tests, we find no conclusive evidence, with the exception of Sicilia for the 
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premium measure. Even then, seasonality does not seem very influential.
15
 Therefore, we 
proceed using the seasonally-unadjusted data. 
The indicators of lending conditions are scaled in annualised percentage points and taken 
from quarterly regional reports published by the Bank of Italy’s Statistical Bulletin.16 Data 
are available from 1999Q1-2014Q2 for 20 NUTS-2 Italian regions: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, 
Lombardia, Liguria, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna 
(Northern); Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio (Central); Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna (Southern). For each of the 20 regions there are 62 
quarterly observations. 
  
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
          Lending Growth Lending Spread Loan-Deposit Premium 
  Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Full Sample  8.53 3.46 6.48 10.41 -1.84 0.58 -3.24 -0.71 5.52 0.40 3.87 7.65 
Northern 9.01 4.12 8.08 10.41 -1.45 0.52 -2.13 -0.71 4.83 0.36 3.87 5.85 
Central 8.80 3.39 8.40 9.67 -1.63 0.56 -1.97 -1.37 5.04 0.50 4.77 5.65 
Southern 7.91 2.83 6.48 9.51 -2.32 0.64 -3.24 -1.62 6.45 0.39 5.65 7.65 
             Cluster 1 8.69 3.43 6.48 10.41 -1.88 0.59 -3.24 -0.71 5.33 0.38 4.42 6.73
Northern 9.38 4.24 8.44 10.41 -1.47 0.52 -2.13 -0.71 5.14 0.34 4.42 5.85 
Central 8.80 3.39 8.40 9.67 -1.63 0.56 -1.97 -1.37 5.13 0.56 4.78 5.65 
Southern 8.05 2.78 6.48 9.51 -2.42 0.67 -3.24 -1.64 6.65 0.47 5.90 6.73 
             Cluster 2 8.04 3.23 7.31 8.92 -1.49 0.57 -1.62 -1.36 5.16 0.38 3.87 7.65 
Northern 8.41 3.93 8.08 8.92 -1.36 0.52 -1.36 -1.36 4.73 0.37 3.87 5.85 
Central - - - - - - - - 4.77 0.31 4.77 4.77 
Southern 7.50 2.97 7.31 7.70 -1.62 0.44 -1.62 -1.62 6.65 0.47 5.65 7.65 
Source: Authors’ own computation using the Gauss code of Phillips and Sul (2007) and data sourced from the Bank of 
Italy’s Statistical Bulletin. 
Note: Mean, Min and Max corresponds to the sample mean, minimum and maximum values based on the cross-sectional 
averages for the full sample, for regions in clusters 1 and 2, and northern, central and southern regions SD stands for 
standard deviation, which is computed across time for individual regions and then averaged across regions as it is 
indicated in the table. 
 
Differences in lending conditions are apparent across Italy (see Table 1).
17
 Northern regions 
exhibit higher consumer lending growth, less negative lending spreads and smaller loan-
deposit premia than other regions. Southern regions exhibit much lower lending growth, more 
negative lending spreads and higher loan-deposit premia. Furthermore, the lending spread is 
higher in northern Italy, which suggests that the cost of short-term borrowing is relatively low 
and that demand for loans associated with longer-term projects is relatively high in northern 
regions. Constraints and mark-ups, which are part of the loan-deposit premia, are higher in 
southern Italy, which is indicative of the lower levels of banking sector efficiency, 
competitiveness and higher perceived risk in these regions.  
The sample standard deviations and range of conditions even within northern, central and 
southern regions are indicative of considerable sample heterogeneity across time and space. 
When all quarters and regions are considered, lending growth rates range from as low as 
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0.73% in southern Italy to as high as 22.6% in northern Italy; lending spreads range from -4% 
in southern Italy to 0.8% in southern Italy; loan-deposit premia range from 3.1% in northern 
Italy to 8.8% in southern Italy. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Aggregated Estimation 
The first part of the convergence analysis concerns lending conditions across all Italian 
regions. For comparison, the output for lending growth, lending spread and the loan-deposit 
premium under both pooled and panel estimation, are all presented in Table 2. The pooled 
approach involves estimating the log-t model for each region vis-à-vis the Italian national 
counterparts for lending growth, spread and premium indicators. Regional estimates for the 
crucial parameter ϕ1 of equation (7), which conveys information about the speed of 
convergence, are then averaged to obtain the pooled estimates. Under the panel approach, the 
log-t model is estimated once for all 20 regions. Both approaches can be used to examine 
convergence. Table 2 summarises the estimation output, which is based on various estimators, 
including least squares, iteratively re-weighted least squares and dummy variable interaction 
augmentations of both. 
 
Table 2. Log-t Convergence Test – Various Estimators   
                   LS IRLS LSDV(1) LSDV(2) 
 
Pooled Panel Pooled Panel Pooled Panel Pooled Panel 
Lending Growth 
ϕ1 -2.69** -2.92*** -2.53*** -2.37*** -2.73*** -3.18*** -2.73*** -2.42*** 
 
(1.21) (0.24) (0.50) (0.14) (1.11) (0.19) (0.71) (0.13) 
Lending Spread 
ϕ1 -1.29** -1.86*** -1.91*** -1.87*** -1.21** -1.87*** -1.21*** -1.88*** 
 
(0.58) (0.01) (0.32) (0.03) (0.53) (0.04) (0.38) (0.01) 
Loan-Deposit Premium 
ϕ1 -1.52*** -1.93*** -1.78*** -1.92*** -1.54*** -1.94*** -1.54*** -1.94*** 
 
(0.45) (0.01) (0.26) (0.01) (0.40) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01) 
 Source: See source in Table 1. 
Note: Parameter ϕ1 corresponds to equation (7). LS, IRLS, LSDV(1), LSDV(2) correspond to estimation using 
least squares, iteratively re-weighted least squares, and dummy variable interaction augmentations of both. 
Dummy variable terms account for changes in the intercept and slope during 2008-2010. Estimates corresponding 
to dummy variable terms are not reported for brevity, but are available from the authors upon request. Newey-
West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are reported (in parentheses). ***, ** and * 
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Reported in Table 2 are the point estimates for parameter ϕ1 and corresponding standard 
errors (in parentheses). Point estimates, which are twice the scaled speed of convergence, 2α, 
are significantly less than zero indicating overall to divergence of lending growth rates, 
spreads and risk premia across Italian regions. Point estimates are quite similar under the 
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various estimators and from both pooled and panel estimation, although estimates obtained 
under panel estimation are much more precise. The relative size of the point estimates implies 
that the rate of divergence of lending growth has sometimes been more than double that of 
the lending spread and loan-deposit premium, which are more comparable. Similar estimates 
are obtained for different non-bank lending markets – lending to consumer households, non-
financial firms and producer households – where the latter includes proprietors and sole 
entrepreneurs (see Table 3). There is clear evidence at an aggregated level of divergence in 
Italian regional lending markets.  
 
Table 3. Log-t Convergence Test for Lending Growth - Various Estimators   
                   LS IRLS LSDV(1) LSDV(2) 
 
Pooled Panel Pooled Panel Pooled Panel Pooled Panel 
 Consumer Households 
ϕ1 -2.69** -2.92*** -2.53*** -2.37*** -2.73*** -3.18*** -2.73*** -2.42*** 
 
(1.21) (0.24) (0.50) (0.14) (1.11) (0.19) (0.71) (0.13) 
Non-Financial Firms 
ϕ1 -3.08*** -3.11*** -3.18*** -3.08*** -3.22*** -3.35*** -3.32*** -3.36*** 
 
(1.16) (0.07) (0.53) (0.17) (1.03) (0.23) (0.27) (0.12) 
Proprietors 
ϕ1 -2.76*** -2.90*** -3.20*** -2.85*** -2.68*** -3.09*** -2.86*** -3.12*** 
 
(0.93) (0.04) (0.40) (0.12) (0.85) (0.13) (0.25) (0.08) 
Source: See source in Table 1. 
Note: See note in Table 2. 
 
 
These findings are not unexpected since Italy is a country with longstanding differences in 
terms of economic characteristics and regional financial structure. However, regarding the 
temporal evolution of the speed of convergence, estimation of equation (8) provides evidence 
of changes across the trimmed sample.
18
 The temporal estimate, ϕ1,t, which is indicated in any 
given period τ by the estimate of ϕ1 + ᴨ1,τ, and is negative for most periods, with no 
favourable trends emerging over time (see Figures 1-3 below). The speed of convergence for 
consumer bank lending growth becomes significantly negative from 2007; this downward 
trend has been reinforced in subsequent years. Therefore, the relative divergence indicated 
previously may reflect trends in bank lending growth arising across the sample and especially 
around the onset of the global economic and financial crisis.
19
 
 
Figures 1-3. Temporal evolution of the speed of convergence for all regions for bank lending growth (left), non-
bank lending spread (centre) and loan-deposit premium (right). 
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Source: See source in Table 1. 
 
 
The economic implication is that Italian lending conditions are not broadly bound together 
across regions through a cointegrating relationship at the NUTS-2 level. The global economic 
and financial crisis has clearly exacerbated the divergence in lending conditions in a 
generalised way, thus corroborating and extending the finding of Rodriguez-Fuentes (1998). 
This finding may also be related to Dow et al. (2012), who find evidence of unit root 
processes for lending spreads and loan-deposit premia vis-à-vis national counterparts. Both 
the Dow et al. (op. cit.) study and our study suggest that macroeconomic and financial shocks 
have persisted to the extent that, all regions considered, lending conditions have not returned 
to an equilibrium position. Therefore, the divergence appears more persistent rather than 
transient. However, under the alternative hypothesis of this paper, certain regions may be 
converging over time even if divergence is apparent in aggregate. The next task is to 
investigate whether there are particular clusters of regions with convergence characteristics 
and to identify any divergent regions. 
4.2 Disaggregated Estimation 
This section presents and discusses findings from the panel convergence clustering algorithm, 
which helps separate the hypothesis of panel divergence from that of sub-panel convergence. 
4.2.1 Initial Application and Testing 
A first application of the convergence clustering algorithm yields an initial set of results. 
However, one consequence of setting c = 0 is that it tends to raise the chance of finding more 
clusters than the true number (Phillips and Sul, 2009). Therefore, and for robustness, log-t 
tests are conducted across the originally identified clusters to assess whether they may be 
merged into larger clusters. If clusters can be merged into a single cluster, which is 
sufficiently homogenous in terms of convergence characteristics, then the final and initial 
cluster classifications will differ in terms of membership.
20
  
Table 4. Sub-Panel Log-t Convergence Tests for Lending Growth 
Initial Classification Tests of Clusters Merging Final Classification 
Cluster 1 [8] 0.88 Cluster 1 + 2 Cluster 1 + 3 Cluster 1 + 4 Cluster 1 [15] -0.39 
 
(0.42) -0.39 -0.31** -1.42*** 
 
(0.37) 
  
(0.37) (0.17) (0.35) 
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Cluster 2 [7] 0.01 
 
Cluster 2 + 3 Cluster 2 + 4 Cluster 2 [5] -3.36*** 
 
(0.12) 
 
-0.62*** -2.10***   (0.18) 
   
(0.13) (0.17) 
  Cluster 3 [2] -1.74* 
  
Cluster 3 + 4 
  
 
(1.33) 
  
-3.36*** 
  
    
(0.17) 
  Cluster 4 [3] -2.84*** 
       (0.27)    
  Source: See source in Table 1. 
Note: The number of regions in each cluster is indicated in square brackets []. Point estimates for ϕ1 from 
equation (7) are reported along with Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors (in parentheses). ***,** and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 5. Sub-Panel Log-t Convergence Tests for Lending Spread 
Initial Classification Tests of Cluster Merging Final Classification 
Cluster 1 [18] 0.07 Cluster 1 + 2     Cluster 1 [18] 0.07 
 
(0.02) -0.43*** 
   
(0.02) 
  
(0.01) 
    Cluster 2 [2] -2.30*** 
   
Cluster 2 [2] -2.30*** 
 
(0.46) 
    
(0.46) 
Source: See source in Table 1. 
Note: See note in Table 4.  
 
 
Table 6. Sub-Panel Log-t Convergence Tests for Loan-Deposit Premium 
Initial Classification Tests of Cluster Merging Final Classification 
Cluster 1 [6] 0.89 Cluster 1 + 2 Cluster 1 + 3   Cluster 1 [11] 0.38 
 
(0.05) 0.36 -0.57*** 
  
(0.05) 
  
(0.04) (0.01) 
   Cluster 2 [5] 0.05 
 
Cluster 2 + 3 
 
Cluster 2 [9] -0.67*** 
 
(0.03) 
 
-0.60*** 
  
(0.01) 
   
(0.02) 
   Cluster 3 [9] -0.67*** 
       (0.01) 
 
  
  Source: See source in Table 1. 
Note: See note in Table 4. 
 
Tables 4-6 contain three panels. The left panel contains the initial cluster classifications 
following a first application of the clustering algorithm. The first column lists the clusters 
identified with the number of regions in square brackets; the second column provides for each 
cluster the estimates for ϕ1, from which the speed of convergence may be inferred. The 
middle panel contains the outcomes from tests of clusters merging. That is, clusters are 
merged sequentially and the log-t test is conducted for each of the merged clusters. There are 
in total three K x (K-1)/2 unique cluster combinations, where K is the number of clusters 
originally identified. Final cluster classifications are determined from the outcomes of these 
tests.
21
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For lending growth there are four initial clusters (see Table 4). The combination of clusters 1 
and 2 is only weakly convergent because the negative point estimate is not significantly less 
than zero. The null of convergence is rejected for all other cluster combinations. Therefore, 
clusters 1 and 2 are merged into a final (weakly) convergent cluster, whereas clusters 3 and 4 
are combined to form a single divergent cluster. For the lending spread there are only two 
original clusters, which form a divergent cluster when merged; therefore, original and final 
classifications are unchanged (see Table 5). For the loan-deposit premium there are three 
original clusters (see Table 6). It is not possible to reject the null of convergence when 
clusters 1 and 2 are merged; however, the null is rejected when the other clusters are merged, 
resulting in two final clusters.  
4.2.2 Discussion of Final Cluster Classifications 
The results point to the presence of a single convergent cluster and a single divergent cluster 
for lending growth, lending spreads and loan-deposit premia. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
of panel convergence may be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis of sub-panel 
convergence. Our conclusions, which are based on speed of convergence estimates reported 
in Tables 4-6, are unchanged if instead we apply robust IRLS estimation or control for the 
crisis effect using dummy variables.
22
 The final cluster memberships are summarised in 
Table A5 (as in the Appendix). 
Final cluster membership is drawn from across Italy. Membership of the convergent cluster 
for lending growth, lending spreads and loan-deposit premia contains northern and southern 
regions, and all regions from the central regions, except Lazio for the premium indicator. 
There is a series of neighbouring regions that is always classified as convergent: Emilia-
Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata and 
Sicilia. Contrarily, membership of the divergent clusters is drawn almost entirely from non-
central regions. Interestingly, regions at the Italian periphery tend to be associated with 
divergence to a greater extent than those geographically more central regions. The divergent 
lending growth cluster includes Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Calabria and 
Sardegna.
23
 The divergent lending spread cluster includes Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Sardegna. 
The divergent loan-deposit premium cluster includes regions with borders to France, 
Switzerland, Austria and Slovenia, as well as the regions Lazio, Calabria and Sardegna. 
Therefore, our results suggest that a region’s remoteness with respect to the Italian centre-
space may be a crucial factor related to divergence. Spatial clustering of cluster membership 
is confirmed formally by Geary’s c spatial autocorrelation test statistics, which are equal to 
0.385 (p-value = 0.001), 0.134 (p-value = 0.006) and 0.632 (p-value of 0.003) for bank 
lending growth, lending spread, and the loan-deposit premia memberships.
24
 Thus, the null 
hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation in final cluster membership is rejected in all cases at 
the 1% level of significance. 
Description within clusters is broadly in line with statistics at a national level and reported in 
Table 1. Our interpretation is that regions in the convergent cluster are gradually moving 
towards an environment of moderate lending growth, availability of loans, and loan-deposit 
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premia, as it is evident from the corresponding cross-sectional standard deviations for these 
measures (see Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix). The declining loan-deposit premia points to a 
moderation in risk premia and lending mark-ups. The existence of a single convergent cluster 
is suggestive of conditional sigma convergence in lending conditions in the sense that the 
convergence process involves some regions and not others. This evidence for sub-panel 
convergence corroborates the earlier findings on Italian credit markets by Dow et al. (2012). 
These findings are more in line with heterodox theories than conventional neoclassical 
predictions, whereby capital flows should enable more remote, less developed regions to 
catch-up with more affluent regions. 
 
4.2.3 Temporal Evolution of the Speed of Convergence 
This sub-section extends on the previous analysis by using the final cluster classifications to 
estimate the temporal speed of convergence across the sample for different centre and 
periphery combinations. In this case, ‘centre-space’ refers to those regions in the convergent 
cluster, which are geographically more central, whereas ‘periphery’ refers to the divergent 
regions, which are spatial located in more remote parts of northern and southern Italy. To 
proceed, we add sequentially to the convergent clusters the divergent northern and southern 
regions, thus enabling estimation of the temporal speed of divergence of periphery regions 
with respect to convergent regions.  
Two different approaches are considered when classifying regions in the centre-space. First, 
the average lending growth, lending spread and loan-deposit premium is computed across 
convergent regions according to cluster 1 membership. Under this approach, the 
corresponding log-t estimation is based on the normalised cross-sectional variance ratio of the 
average conditions in the centre-space and in periphery regions as it is indicated in Table 7. 
The corresponding speed of convergence estimates for lending growth, lending spread and 
loan-deposit premium indicators are summarised in columns (1), (3) and (5). Second, because 
there is variation within the Italian centre-space, log-t estimation is based on the normalised 
cross-sectional variance ratio of conditions in all cluster 1 regions and periphery regions. The 
corresponding speed of convergence estimates under the second approach are reported in 
columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 7. The key difference is that we treat the centre-space as a 
single region under the first approach and as a set of regions under the second approach. 
 
Table 7 Centre-Space and Periphery Convergence Tests 
 Lending Growth Lending Spread Loan-Deposit Premium 
Centre-Space and Periphery Combinations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Centre and Periphery [Northern + Southern] -3.66*** 
(0.13) 
-1.49*** 
(0.25) 
-5.73*** 
(0.10) 
-0.43*** 
(0.01) 
-0.73*** 
(0.01) 
-0.49*** 
(0.01) 
Centre and Periphery [Northern] -3.78*** 
(0.20) 
-1.04*** 
(0.12) 
-4.97*** 
(0.10) 
-0.17*** 
(0.02) 
-0.50*** 
(0.04) 
-0.36*** 
(0.01) 
Centre and Periphery [Southern] -4.41*** 
(0.27) 
-1.06*** 
(0.43) 
-8.43*** 
(0.70) 
-0.25*** 
(0.01) 
-1.47*** 
(0.02) 
-0.21*** 
(0.01) 
ϕ1_Southern/ϕ1_Northern 1.16 1.02 1.70 1.47 2.94 0.58 
Source: See source in Table 1. 
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Note: Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) correspond to parameter ϕ1 in equation (7) upon the enlargement of 
the convergent cluster to include the periphery regions. Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 1% 
significance level.  
 
Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) in Table 7 correspond to parameter ϕ1 in 
equation (7) upon the enlargement of the convergent cluster to include the periphery regions. 
For lending growth the periphery regions are Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige 
(Northern), Calabria and Sardegna (Southern); for the lending spread the periphery regions 
are Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Northern) and Sardegna (Southern); for the loan-deposit premium 
the periphery regions are Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-
Venezia Giulia (Northern), Calabria and Sardegna (Southern). Centre-space regions are 
members of cluster 1 for lending growth, spread and premium. As expected the estimates of 
the speed of convergence are negative for all centre-periphery combinations, which is 
indicative of divergence in lending conditions of periphery regions with respect to the Italian 
centre-space. This is the case for all the indicators and under both approaches to classifying 
the Italian centre-space.
25
 However, the point estimates for the centre-southern periphery 
combination tend to be more negative than for the centre-northern periphery combination, 
which suggests an asymmetry in the divergence process. The ratio of the speed of 
convergence for southern and northern periphery regions, ϕ1_South/ϕ1_North, in most cases exceeds 
unity and suggests that the speed of divergence in the south may be up to three times faster 
than in the north.  
 
As a further step in the analysis, equation (8) is estimated for various centre-periphery 
combinations to investigate changes in the speed of convergence across the trimmed 
sample.
26
 These findings are not dissimilar to those presented in Figures 1-3 for all Italian 
regions; the speed of convergence is negative for most periods, and there is a downward trend 
over recent years (see Figures 4-6). Following the onset of the global economic and financial 
crisis, the speed of divergence with respect to the Italian centre-space has been greater for 
southern periphery regions and notably so for bank lending growth. The speed of 
convergence for lending growth has become significantly negative from 2008 for the centre- 
northern periphery combination and from 2009 for the centre-southern periphery combination.  
 
Figures 4-6. Temporal evolution of the speed of convergence for centre-space and periphery (northern/southern) 
combinations for bank lending growth (left), lending spread (centre) and loan-deposit premium (right). 
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Source: See source in Table 1. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
To synthesise understanding of convergence in a robust way, probit and logit estimations are 
conducted using a binary dependent variable, which takes a value of unity if any two regions 
are always in the convergent cluster for lending growth, spread and premium, or zero 
otherwise. Various geographic, financial, economic, demographic and policy explanatory 
variables are drawn from the literature. The results from this exercise are summarised in 
Table A6 (as in the Appendix). 
 
In terms of geography, we consider the great-circle distance between regions in kilometres 
and a binary variable, which indicates whether regions are part of the Italian extrema or not. 
The extrema are defined as those regions with borders to neighbouring countries (Valle 
d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Trentino-Alto Adige Fruili-Venezia Giulia, Veneto and 
Lombardia), the southernmost regions (Calabria, Basilicata and Puglia) and islands (Sardegna 
and Sicilia). Evidently, distance and geographic remoteness from the Italian centre-space are 
both negatively and significantly related to the probability of convergence. This may also be 
related to the productivity puzzle, in that proximity to economic activities – financial sector 
or otherwise – may reduce costs associated with gathering information about new 
technologies, markets and competitors (Faini et al., 1993 p. 167).  
 
Differences in liquidity preference of banks seem to matter more than differences in physical 
access to bank branches. The latter are insignificant, whereas the difference in bank liquidity 
preference – measured in terms of the pre-crisis (2007) current account deposits divided by 
total consumer lending – is always highly significant and negatively related to the probability 
of convergence. This may be related to Post-Keynesian liquidity preference theory, as in Dow 
(1992, 1999), and empirical findings elsewhere. For example, both the Crocco et al. (2014) 
study and our study point to a differentiation of banking strategy, whereby banks in more 
developed regions tend to lend less to agents in more remote, under-developed regions. This 
may reflect a preference for liquidity arising from economic uncertainty and perceived 
customer risk; thus, the ‘financially-defensive behaviour’ of banks may be an important part 
of the over and under-extension of regional credit (Dow, 1992 p. 662). 
 
Interestingly the coefficients on the sum of the pre-crisis (2007) regional GDP-per-capita and 
its square indicate that regions with very low or very high pre-crisis income levels are less 
likely to be convergent across our sample, which may reflect underlying differences in the 
risk-profile of agents (D’Amico et al., 1990). Additionally, coefficients on the sum of pre-
crisis (2007) regional lending-to-GDP and its square indicate that regional-pairs with 
moderate levels of financialisation, at least in terms of consumer lending relative to income, 
are more likely to be convergent. Thus, the growing north-south divergence may reflect 
regional financialisation and within that the tendency towards relatively low (high) saving 
and high (low) expenditure in more (less) economically and financially-developed regions. 
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This may be reinforced by interregional financial flows and higher expectations about 
economic and financial prospects in northern regions (Chick and Dow, 1988).  
 
Accumulation of years of credit-driven growth, reinforced by monetary balance sheet and 
credit channels, may explain why certain Italian regions, namely those in the north, have 
generally fared much better following the onset of the crisis in terms of economic 
fundamentals (see, Kitson et al., 2011, their Figure 6, p. 295). As expected, the income 
inequality gap, as measured by the absolute difference in regional Gini indices, is negatively 
related to the probability of convergence. The suggestion here is that agents in the more 
prosperous regions have been better positioned during the crisis in terms of cash, collateral 
and income, while they have not faced financing constraints associated with spatial 
financialisation, inequality and exclusion, which is more prevalent in less developed regions. 
 
Regarding demographic characteristics, there is limited evidence that differences in 
population growth rates affect regional convergence, as the correctly signed estimate is 
insignificant. Finally, a dummy variable is included, which takes a value of unity if at least 
one of the regions has access to European Union (EU) cohesion funds for convergence during 
2007-2013 or zero otherwise.
27
 The marginal effect of the relevant estimates indicates that 
funding access increases the probability of convergence by approximately 0.2. Therefore, 
other factors aside, there is some evidence here that cohesion policy has helped promote 
financial sector convergence over our sample. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Against the backdrop of theoretical ambiguities and growing concerns of policymakers about 
macroeconomic and financial instability in an era of financialisation, this paper analyses 
convergence of Italian bank lending conditions. In this contribution we compile and employ a 
relatively extensive NUTS-2 level dataset to investigate convergence in regional bank 
lending growth, lending spreads and loan-deposit premia over the period 1999 to 2014. The 
case of Italy is particularly interesting because over more recent years the prospect of 
convergence seems even further out of sight, despite the implementation of various policies 
designed to reduce the longstanding north-south divide. This paper extends the methodology 
of Phillips and Sul (2007), which permits powerful modelling of long-run equilibria within a 
heterogeneous panel data context, to investigate further both the spatial scale and temporal 
evolution of convergence.  
This paper’s empirical strategy proves insightful since it identifies situations where lending 
conditions are converging across certain regions even if divergence is detected overall, thus 
corroborating previous findings of Dow et al. (2012). Furthermore, this paper identifies a 
convergent cluster of regions, which are more central geographically than regions in the 
divergent cluster, while the speed of divergence has increased notably for southern regions 
since the onset of the global economic and financial crisis. We are also able to link 
convergence with proximity to the Italian centre-space, regional financialisation, bank 
liquidity preference, the distribution of income and access to EU cohesion funds. In this 
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respect, our study goes above and beyond the previous literature by providing new results, 
which suggest that the evolution of regional financial behaviour has become an important 
factor related to the growing Italian north-south divide.   
In conclusion this paper finds a significant relationship between regional financialisation and 
financial systems convergence. If financial flows within Italy cannot be relied upon by 
themselves to promote interregional convergence, and if instead they have exacerbated 
longstanding disparities in Italy, then some rebalancing is required in the policy response. 
Our findings suggest that policymakers should continue reducing informational problems in 
the south and associated inefficiencies, while putting in place structures to more effectively 
moderate lending behaviour and promoting further cohesion across and within countries.  
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Table A1. Temporal Speed of Convergence  
 
Lending Growth Lending Spread Loan-Deposit Premium 
Year θ SE(θ)  p-value  θ SE(θ)  p-value  θ SE(θ)  p-value  
ϕ1 0.95 (0.02) [1.00] -0.09 (0.03) [0.00] -0.57 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2005 -0.34 (0.02) [1.00] -0.56 (0.05) [0.00] 0.01 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2006 -0.58 (0.03) [1.00] -0.95 (0.03) [0.00] 0.09 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2007 -1.21 (0.05) [0.00] -0.88 (0.03) [0.00] 0.19 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2008 -2.20 (0.06) [0.00] -0.34 (0.05) [0.00] 0.20 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2009 -3.14 (0.02) [0.00] 0.28 (0.04) [1.00] 0.12 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2010 -2.75 (0.03) [0.00] 0.35 (0.03) [1.00] 0.01 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2011 -2.70 (0.03) [0.00] 0.01 (0.04) [0.00] -0.07 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2012 -3.74 (0.25) [0.00] -0.25 (0.03) [0.00] -0.06 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2013 -13.81 (0.47) [0.00] -0.50 (0.04) [0.00] -0.08 (0.02) [0.00] 
π1,2014 -13.32 (0.35) [0.00] -1.13 (0.05) [0.00] -0.28 (0.02) [0.00] 
Source: See source in Table 1. 
Note: Parameter θ for year 2004 corresponds to parameter ϕ1 in equation (8), estimated using ordinary least squares. 
Parameters θ for years 2005-2014 correspond to the dummy variable interaction terms π1,τ. Newey-West 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are reported (in parentheses). The p-value is reported in 
square brackets [] for a one-tailed t-test with a null hypothesis of convergence. 
 
Table A2. Temporal Speed of Convergence of Centre-Space and Periphery Combinations – Lending Growth 
 
Centre and Periphery Centre and Periphery(North) Centre and Periphery(South) 
Year θ SE(θ)  p-value  θ SE(θ)  p-value  θ SE(θ)  p-value  
ϕ1 0.95 (0.02) [1.00] 0.83 (0.02) [1.00] 0.99 (0.01) [1.00] 
π1,2005 -0.34 (0.02) [1.00] -0.31 (0.02) [1.00] 0.03 (0.01) [1.00] 
π1,2006 -0.58 (0.03) [1.00] -0.51 (0.02) [1.00] 0.17 (0.01) [1.00] 
π1,2007 -1.21 (0.05) [0.00] -0.87 (0.04) [0.10] -0.27 (0.04) [1.00] 
π1,2008 -2.20 (0.06) [0.00] -1.76 (0.07) [0.00] -0.84 (0.02) [1.00] 
π1,2009 -3.14 (0.02) [0.00] -3.21 (0.03) [0.00] -1.02 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2010 -2.75 (0.03) [0.00] -2.84 (0.04) [0.00] -1.34 (0.05) [0.00] 
π1,2011 -2.70 (0.03) [0.00] -2.12 (0.03) [0.00] -3.46 (0.17) [0.00] 
π1,2012 -3.74 (0.25) [0.00] -2.24 (0.09) [0.00] -8.99 (0.39) [0.00] 
π1,2013 -13.81 (0.47) [0.00] -6.85 (0.40) [0.00] -17.25 (0.32) [0.00] 
π1,2014 -13.32 (0.35) [0.00] -11.03 (0.16) [0.00] -16.41 (0.46) [0.00] 
Source: See source in Table 1.  
Note: See note in Table A1. 
 
Table A3. Temporal Speed of Convergence of Centre-Space and Periphery Combinations – Lending Spread 
 
Centre and Periphery Centre and Periphery(North) Centre and Periphery(South) 
Year θ SE(θ)  p-value  θ SE(θ)  p-value  θ SE(θ)  p-value  
ϕ1 -0.09 (0.03) [0.00] -0.09 (0.03) [0.00] -0.07 (0.03) [0.00] 
π1,2005 -0.56 (0.05) [0.00] -0.58 (0.05) [0.00] -0.54 (0.04) [0.00] 
π1,2006 -0.95 (0.03) [0.00] -0.95 (0.03) [0.00] -0.92 (0.03) [0.00] 
π1,2007 -0.88 (0.03) [0.00] -0.88 (0.03) [0.00] -0.84 (0.03) [0.00] 
π1,2008 -0.34 (0.05) [0.00] -0.29 (0.05) [0.00] -0.25 (0.05) [0.00] 
π1,2009 0.28 (0.04) [1.00] 0.45 (0.05) [1.00] 0.44 (0.04) [1.00] 
π1,2010 0.35 (0.03) [1.00] 0.76 (0.03) [1.00] 0.66 (0.03) [1.00] 
π1,2011 0.01 (0.04) [0.00] 0.80 (0.03) [1.00] 0.46 (0.03) [1.00] 
π1,2012 -0.25 (0.03) [0.00] 0.91 (0.05) [1.00] 0.26 (0.03) [1.00] 
π1,2013 -0.50 (0.04) [0.00] 0.70 (0.05) [1.00] -0.06 (0.04) [0.00] 
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π1,2014 -1.13 (0.05) [0.00] -0.18 (0.06) [0.00] -0.86 (0.05) [0.00] 
Source: See source in Table 1. 
Note: See note in Table A1 
 
Table A4. Temporal Speed of Convergence of Centre-Space and Periphery Combinations – Loan-Deposit Premium 
 
Centre and Periphery Centre and Periphery(North) Centre and Periphery(South) 
Year θ SE(θ)  p-value  θ SE(θ)  p-value  θ SE(θ)  p-value  
ϕ1 -0.61 (0.00) [0.00] -0.56 (0.01) [0.00] -0.56 (0.00) [0.00] 
π1,2005 0.04 (0.00) [0.00] 0.14 (0.01) [0.00] 0.09 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2006 0.15 (0.01) [0.00] 0.32 (0.01) [0.00] 0.26 (0.02) [0.00] 
π1,2007 0.27 (0.00) [0.00] 0.43 (0.00) [0.00] 0.49 (0.00) [0.00] 
π1,2008 0.28 (0.01) [0.00] 0.36 (0.01) [0.00] 0.67 (0.01) [1.00] 
π1,2009 0.16 (0.01) [0.00] 0.15 (0.01) [0.00] 0.67 (0.01) [1.00] 
π1,2010 0.05 (0.01) [0.00] 0.02 (0.01) [0.00] 0.48 (0.02) [0.00] 
π1,2011 -0.00 (0.01) [0.00] -0.00 (0.01) [0.00] 0.23 (0.02) [0.00] 
π1,2012 0.01 (0.00) [0.00] 0.10 (0.01) [0.00] -0.00 (0.01) [0.00] 
π1,2013 -0.04 (0.01) [0.00] 0.15 (0.01) [0.00] -0.23 (0.02) [0.00] 
π1,2014 -0.27 (0.01) [0.00] -0.07 (0.01) [0.00] -0.60 (0.01) [0.00] 
Source: See source in Table 1.  
Note: See note in Table A1. 
 
Table A5. Final Cluster Membership 
Cluster Membership  Conclusion 
Lending Growth 
Cluster 1: Lombardia, Liguria, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, 
Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Sicilia   
Convergent 
Cluster 2: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto, Calabria, Sardegna Divergent 
Lending Spread 
Cluster 1: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria, Trentino-Alto, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, 
Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia  
Convergent 
Cluster 2: Friuli-Venezia, Sardegna Divergent 
Loan-Deposit Premium 
Cluster 1: Valle d’Aosta, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, 
Puglia, Basilicata, Sicilia 
Convergent 
Cluster 2: Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria, Trentino-Alto Veneto, Friuli-Venezia, Lazio, Calabria, 
Sardegna 
Divergent 
Source: See source in Table 1.  
 
  
Figures A1-A3. Normalised standard deviations (SD) of convergent clusters for lending growth, lending spread 
and loan-deposit premium. Standard deviations are normalised by the first observation in the trimmed sample. 
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Source: See source in Table 1. 
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Table A6. Convergent Cluster Membership – Evidence from Probit and Logit Estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Distance  -0.002** -0.003** -0.002* -0.003* -0.002** -0.005** -0.004*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Extrema -1.195*** -2.201*** -1.272*** -2.309*** -1.137*** -2.083*** -1.346*** -2.444*** 
 
(0.314) (0.635) (0.357) (0.712) (0.357) (0.698) (0.477) (0.919) 
Difference in Branches 
  
0.463 0.997 1.777* 3.341* 0.947 1.567 
   
(0.651) (1.150) (0.982) (1.717) (1.482) (2.848) 
Difference in Liquidity 
Preference 
  
-2.415*** -4.095*** -2.288*** -3.865*** -2.330*** -4.004*** 
   
(0.499) (0.895) (0.518) (0.910) (0.778) (1.411) 
Loans/GDP (%) 
  
-0.069*** -0.121*** 0.325* 0.597* 0.442** 0.790** 
   
(0.025) (0.044) (0.181) (0.308) (0.203) (0.351) 
Loans/GDP x Loans/GDP 
(%) 
    
-0.005** -0.008** -0.005** -0.008** 
     
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
GDP-per-capita (PPS) 
      
0.817*** 1.454** 
       
(0.307) (0.571) 
GDP-per-capita  x GDP-
per-capita (PPS) 
      
-0.009*** -0.015*** 
       
(0.003) (0.006) 
Difference in GINI Index  
      
-0.235** -0.426** 
       
(0.116) (0.211) 
Difference in Population 
Growth (%) 
      
-0.043 -0.081 
       
(0.045) (0.080) 
Cohesion Funds 
      
1.446*** 2.628** 
       
(0.522) (1.048) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.161 0.161 0.306 0.307 0.324 0.327 0.516 0.512 
Pseudo LL -87.259 -87.259 -72.148 -72.131 -70.27 -70.037 -50.361 -50.716 
Model p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
N 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 
Source: Authors’ own computation. Data on the number of bank branches, household loans, current account deposits are from 
Statistical Bulletin; nominal GDP, GDP-per-capita PPS (purchasing power standards) and population growth data are from Eurostat; 
GINI index data are from ISTAT. The difference in bank branches, liquidity preference, nominal loans/GDP, nominal GDP, GDP-
per-capita, difference in GINI indices is based on pre-crisis data for the year 2007. The population growth differential is computed 
over the period 2004-2014.  
Notes: Probit estimates are reported in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7); logit estimates are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). The 
pseudo R-squared (Pseudo R
2
), pseudo log-likelihood (Pseudo LL), p-value from a joint test of significance of the slope parameters 
in square brackets [] and sample-size for estimation (N) are reported. The constant term is included in all regressions, but not 
presented for brevity. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported (in parentheses). ***,** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
                                                          
Endnotes 
1
 The authors are grateful to three anonymous referees for their useful comments, which have helped to improve 
the paper. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. 
2
 For example, Martin and Minns (1995) find that UK pension funds are mainly channelled into investments via 
institutions headed in London and surrounding areas; however, little of the money trickles down to the other 
regions to finance capital investment or promote business expansion. Rodriguez-Fuentes (1998) analyses the 
relationship between Spanish regional credit growth and GDP-per-capita over the period 1985-1993; the 
negative association is indicative of a catching-up process, i.e. less developed regions experience higher lending 
growth, although the relationship reverses during crises. However, the relationship is assumed to be constant 
within subsamples, regions and across sectors. Crocco et al. (2014) conduct another aggregated analysis and 
show over the period 1999-2008 that Brazilian regional credit availability depends on the distance from 
centralised financial markets, the distribution of income, physical access to banks and measures of liquidity 
preference, although their contribution focuses on credit access rather than convergence. Dow et al. (2012) 
apply unit root tests to investigate stationarity of Italian regional interest rate spreads over the period 1998-2008. 
The empirical evidence uncovered in this study confirms the proposition that “overcentralisation of the financial 
system disadvantages peripheral regions, and, second, a local financial infrastructure characterised by local and 
regional-based banks is better for those regions” (p. 894).  
3
 In the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), there are three levels for Italy; these correspond 
to regional groupings (NUTS-1), regions (NUTS-2) and provinces (NUTS-3). Italy is divided into twenty 
NUTS-2 regions, which represent the first-level administrative divisions of the country. 
4
 Faini et al. (1993), and relevant literature therein, also argue, and provide relevant empirical evidence, for 
financial policies in view of the productivity puzzle (which is due to the financial sector’s problems that are 
different and more severe from the rest of Italy’s regions); in effect finance in the South of Italy is inefficient in 
comparison to the rest of the country. Also informational asymmetries, which “may result in too much money 
being invested in high risk projects and too little in safe projects” (Faini et al., op. cit., p. 187) are highlighted in 
the case of the less developed regions in Italy. In addition, government failure is also held responsible for the 
poor performance of southern Italy. In general terms, Faini et al. (op. cit.) suggest that “financial intermediaries’ 
operating costs are higher in the South, while productivity, profits and own capital are lower” (p. 197). In effect 
the Faini et al. (op. cit.) contribution is from the point of view of ‘financial liberalisation’ rather than from 
‘regional financialisation’, the focus of our contribution. 
5
 Rughoo and Sarantis (2014) and Matousek et al. (2015) employ the Phillips and Sul (2007) methodology to 
investigate international financial convergence between 2003-2011 and 2005-2012 respectively. However, the 
focus of these studies is on banking integration and efficiency at a country level, rather than on regional 
financial-sector accumulation. As to why the Phillips Sul (op. cit.) method has not been utilised so far in the 
financialisation literature, this is an interesting question. The reason may very well be that the method is a 
relatively recent development, but more importantly it may be that the focus of the relevant literature is such that 
this method has not been helpful. We would argue, though, as we do in the main text of this contribution that the 
Phillips Sul (op. cit.) method focuses on the speed of convergence, which can change over time; this is clearly, 
and in our view, an important consideration in the case of Italy.  
6
 Simulations indicate that the log-t test works well even for moderately small sample-sizes that are common in 
applied work (Phillips and Sul, 2007 p. 1812). 
7
 A battery of panel unit root tests suggests that over the sample period bank lending conditions considered in 
this paper are either trend stationary (lending growth) or stochastic nonstationary processes (lending spread and 
premium). However, the log-t test does not rely on any particular assumptions about trend stationarity or 
stochastic nonstationary (Phillips and Sul, 2007 p. 1773).  
8
 Phillips and Sul (2007) model the regional transition coefficients as follows: 



ttL
tii
iti
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,
,   
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where i  is a constant; L(t) is a slowly-moving function of time, t; stochastic term ti , is iid(0,1), scaled by 
parameter i , and may be weakly dependent over time. Parameter, α, governs the rate at which the cross-
sectional variation decays to zero over time. The inclusion of L(t) ensures over time that iti  ,  even if α = 0. 
9
 We set the value of lambda to 1,600, which is the standard calibration for quarterly data. 
10
 There are as many dummy variable interaction terms as there are years in the trimmed sample less one to 
avoid the dummy-variables trap. 
11
 Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest setting c = 0 when T is small to ensure that it is highly conservative. 
12
 The short-term lending rate is based on loans with duration of up to one year and the long-term rate is based 
on loans with duration of more than one year. 
13
 The deposit rate is payable on current accounts. The lending rate corresponds to matched and revocable loans.  
14
 For each variable of interest and region we reject the null hypothesis of a seasonal unit root at 5% and 10 % 
significance levels. These results are not reported to conserve space, but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
15
 For instance, using the popular X12-ARIMA algorithm and the seasonality F-tests therein, we obtain a 
correlation between the unadjusted and seasonally-adjusted series of 0.98. Furthermore, convergence test 
outcomes are almost identical if adjusted data for Sicilia are used instead; importantly, our main conclusions are 
unchanged. 
16
 Bank lending data are distributed by customer location (region) and segment of economic activity. For further 
details about the construction and reporting of data see the Methodological Appendix of the Bank of Italy’s 
Statistical Bulletin, which is available at: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/bollettino-statistico/. 
17
 Cluster statistics reported in the table correspond to results obtained from the clustering algorithm of Phillips 
and Sul (2007), and discussed in section 4.2.2. 
18
 See Table A1 in the Appendix for estimation output corresponding to the temporal speed of convergence 
parameters.  
19
 The downward trend in convergence for consumer lending growth is also apparent for non-financial firms and 
proprietors, especially during the final years in the sample. However, the divergence over these years is 
relatively severe for consumer lending growth. Speed of convergence estimates for non-financial firms become 
statistically less than zero from 2009; for proprietors, the speed of convergence is statistically less than zero for 
all but one year in the sample. These results are not illustrated graphically for brevity, but all results referred to 
in this contribution are available from the authors upon request.  
 
20
 The clustering algorithm of Phillips and Sul (2007) is based on least squares estimation; however, we also 
verify the conclusions reached using iteratively re-weighted least squares and dummy variables interaction 
estimations. 
21
 For example, three clusters are initially identified for the loan-deposit premium. To test merging of clusters, 
cluster 1 and 2 are first combined; if the resulting merged cluster exhibits convergence, i.e. φ1 ≥ 0, then the 
merged cluster may be classified as a convergent cluster. We then try merging the other original clusters and re-
test for convergence. Since only clusters 1 and 2 can be combined to form a convergent cluster, we have two 
final clusters from cluster 1 + cluster 2. What remains is cluster 3, which is classified as the divergent cluster. 
22
 The speed of convergence is never (always) significantly less than zero for those regions classified as 
convergent (divergent). These results are not reported for brevity. All results referred to in the main text are 
available from the authors upon request.  
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23
 If the regional consumer price index is used to deflate the nominal bank lending data, a measure of real 
lending growth may be constructed, for which we obtain similar results, albeit with minor changes to cluster 
membership. 
24
 The inverse spatial-weighting matrix is constructed using a binary indicator for whether regions share a 
border. 
25
 We note that the speed of divergence is greater when the centre-space is measured as the regional average of 
cluster 1 members; this may reflect the greater weight of divergent periphery regions in the relative transition 
coefficient. 
26
 See Table A2-A4 in the Appendix for estimation output corresponding to the temporal speed of convergence 
parameters. 
27
 Our focus is on the main beneficiaries of EU cohesion funds, which are the regions with low historic 
convergence, i.e. Campania, Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia and Basilicata. The convergence objective concerns 
regions characterised by low levels of GDP and employment, where GDP-per-capita is less than 75% of the EU 
average between 2000 and 2002, as detailed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/country2009/it_en.pdf. 
